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Risk management - why process must come before the spreadsheet

Risk management in the GRC context

Risk Management

A risk worksheet can easily become just another document required by a management system. The fields can be completed, scores assigned and the result approved. Yet one question remains: have the people who influence the process actually considered what could go wrong and how to protect against it?

Tags: Risk Management Published: Updated: ⏱ 8 min read

My approach starts with understanding the function of the process and the conditions in which it operates. I then choose how to analyse risk and document the findings. The worksheet is useful, but its value depends on the quality of the discussion and decisions behind it.

Start with the function of the process

Every process has its own characteristics. I therefore start by asking: what must it deliver, and how will we know that it fulfils its function? I then consider what could prevent it from achieving the intended outcome.

Taking a systems approach, I look at the interconnected elements of the process:

This review helps structure the discussion. It does not mean that every process needs an identical list of risks. The same questions may lead to different findings in production, maintenance and information security.

Dependencies also matter. A problem at the output of one process may originate in an unsuitable input from another area. An analysis limited to a single workstation or department may miss this.

Assessment needs people who know the process

People who work with a process should help identify what could disrupt it. They know the everyday difficulties, exceptions, dependencies and ways of dealing with problems.

The person facilitating the assessment helps organise this information, ask questions and connect different perspectives. They cannot replace the knowledge of everyone involved in the process.

This is why I value interdisciplinary collaboration. Production, quality, maintenance, automation and IT may see the same event differently. Bringing these perspectives together helps identify omissions and choose actions that can work in practice.

The worksheet should record the results of that work: the scenario, possible consequences, existing controls, the rationale for the assessment and responsibility for further action. Assigning scores alone does not complete the assessment.

Organisational context matters

A solution justified in one environment may not be the right response in another. The system's function, accessibility, surroundings, dependencies and existing controls all matter.

Some physical access scenarios will be assessed differently for a distributed device in a public location and for a device inside a locked cabinet on controlled factory premises. Fencing, entry controls and restricted access form part of that assessment.

They do not address every threat, however. Network connections, service access, the actions of authorised people and the ability to recover after disruption must still be considered. An existing control may reduce one scenario while leaving others unchanged.

The same applies to a server room. Solutions used in a large data centre can provide a useful reference, but applying them in a particular organisation needs justification. The choice should follow the requirements and risks of that environment.

An auditor should assess a solution with this context in mind. I expect openness to a different approach when the organisation can demonstrate its effectiveness and fulfilment of requirements. Familiarity with a particular tool should not replace an assessment of evidence.

This works both ways. The organisation should be able to justify its solution. Simply saying "things are different here" is insufficient, and context does not remove the obligation to meet applicable requirements.

I choose the tool to fit the purpose

Having many methods available does not mean that all of them should be used. First, we need to know what question the analysis should answer and what decision it should support.

A simple scoring model may help organise risks. A more detailed approach may be needed where technical dependencies, multiple possible causes or serious consequences of failure are important.

In an S × O model, combining ratings for the severity of consequences and occurrence of an event, the scale definitions and the rationale for the assigned ratings matter. The product of those ratings is not a measure of expected loss.

The same score may represent a rare event with severe consequences or a frequent issue with limited consequences. Decisions therefore require a return to the scenario rather than stopping at the number.

A method should help us understand risk and justify our response. Its complexity alone does not demonstrate the quality of the assessment.

Risk reduction does not always require expensive technology

I support reducing risk. However, I do not assume that every identified gap requires another tool to be purchased.

First, we should establish what is actually missing. Is the problem a technical control, incorrect configuration, unclear responsibility, a lack of competence or failure to follow existing rules?

In some situations, organisational measures can provide an effective response: clarifying access arrangements, assigning responsibilities, changing working methods, training or regular verification. Other situations require technical controls or a combination of both.

An organisational measure also needs to be checked. Writing a procedure does not mean that people understand and follow it. Similarly, purchasing a device does not prove that it has been configured correctly or will be maintained.

When comparing solutions, I consider their expected effectiveness, implementation and maintenance costs, impact on everyday work and the risk remaining after controls are applied. A lower price does not settle the choice, but a higher price does not guarantee a better outcome either.

Risk acceptance is not a failure

Not every risk can be eliminated. Further reduction may not always be justified or feasible.

Depending on the situation, an organisation may reduce risk, discontinue an activity, share certain consequences with another party or consciously accept the remaining risk. These responses can complement each other.

Acceptance should not mean overlooking the problem. It needs a rationale, an authorised decision-maker and defined conditions for revisiting the assessment. A lack of budget alone does not demonstrate that the risk is acceptable.

Similarly, transfer through insurance, for example, may cover certain financial consequences. It does not automatically transfer all consequences and organisational obligations.

For me, maturity means understanding the decision being made. I prefer clearly justified acceptance to a claim of risk reduction based on a control whose effectiveness nobody has checked.

Assessment should return to the process

Completing the analysis and approving the worksheet do not finish the work. After implementing an action, we need to check whether it helps achieve the intended outcome and whether it has introduced new difficulties.

The assessment should be revisited when the process, technology, responsibilities or operating conditions change. An incident, an audit finding or feedback from employees that a solution is not working as intended may also trigger a review.

Indicators help, but they need interpretation. A result within target does not provide a complete picture of process performance. Conversations with people, observation and a review of evidence complement numerical data.

Summary

Risk management should help people make decisions about a process. It requires an understanding of its function, consideration of context and participation by those who influence its operation.

The choice of method, controls and response should follow that assessment. Reduction matters, but informed acceptance can also be a justified decision.

A worksheet fulfils its role when we can explain how the assessment was reached, why a particular action was chosen and how we will check its effectiveness.

Further reading

ISO 31000:2018 provides general guidance on risk management. ISO/IEC 27005:2022 develops information security risk management in the context of an ISMS. For audit assessment, ISO 19011 provides guidance that includes evaluating evidence against audit criteria.

Questions and answers

Can a simple worksheet be sufficient?

Yes, if it records the significant scenarios, assessment rationale, decisions and responsibilities. Its usefulness depends on the purpose and complexity of the process being assessed.

Can an auditor challenge the chosen solution?

Yes, if evidence shows that it does not meet the relevant requirements. The organisation should be able to explain its choice, and the audit assessment should refer to criteria and evidence. A different solution does not, by itself, establish a nonconformity.

Can an organisational control replace a technical one?

It may be sufficient in some scenarios and insufficient in others. This depends on the requirements, operating conditions and effectiveness of the control. They should not be assumed to be interchangeable without assessment.

When should an accepted risk be revisited?

At the agreed time and whenever the assumptions behind the decision change, new information becomes available or controls stop working as expected.

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